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In October 1986 the Institute of 
Medicine and the National Acad- 
emy of Sciences (IOMMAS) jointly 
released a report entitled Confiont- 
ing AIDS: Directions for Public 
Health, Health Care, and Research. 
The document was unique in several 
respects. It was the first such study 
co-sponsored by the two organiza- 
tions; it was the first to be under- 
taken and completed on a “fast- 
track” six-month time schedule, 
reflecting the urgency of the prob- 
lems it addressed; and it was initi- 
ated and funded independently by 
IOM/NAS in order to lend weight to 
and ensure the credibility of its find- 
ings. The charge to the Committee 
assembled in March 1986 had been 
to develop a national strategy for 
coping with the AIDS epidemic and 
to make recommendations across 
the entire range of complex prob- 
lems raised by the advent of the new 
and deadly disease. 
The stark numbers that form the 
basis of the report speak for them- 
selves: the United States has experi- 
enced a new epidemic viral disease 
for less than a decade, and yet as 
of October 1986 we were already 
confronted with more than z5,ooo 
cases of the acquired immunodefi- 
ciency syndrome-AIDS-which is 
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a uniformly lethal disease. In addi- 
tion over 100,ooo more individuals 
were ill with diseases not technically 
diagnosed as AIDS but that were the 
result of infection with the virus, 
HIV; and a conservative estimate set 
the number of silently infected per- 
sons at 1.5 million or more. Further- 
more, as the Committee assessed the 
present state of knowledge concern- 
ing epidemiology and pathogene- 
sis, it made the strongly based pre- 
diction that ten-fold more cases of 
AIDS would be diagnosed within 
the next five years. 
Those figures are startling in 
themselves, but their ominous sig- 
nificance looms still larger as the 
ramifications of the epidemic are 
measured and assessed. Because 
HIV is transmitted almost exclu- 
sively by sexual intercourse or by 
blood (including contaminated IV 
drug apparatus), its target popu- 
lation is comprised dominantly of 
young and middle-aged adults 
whose social behavior puts them in 
its path. The life expectancy after a 
diagnosis of AIDS is less than two 
years; so for the first time since the 
Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918- 
19, we must contemplate the rather 
sudden deletion of thousands of 
people in the prime of life, many 
of whom are trained, talented, and 
productive members of society. The 
estimated incubation period-from 
acquisition of viral infection to onset 
of the disease AIDS-is at least four 
to five years, which means that 80 
percent of the projected z50,ooo 
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cases of AIDS that will have accrued 
between now and 1991 will result 
from infections already under way. 
That is, those people are irretriev- 
ably infected at present and incubat- 
ing their future troubles. 
Estimates of the likelihood that 
AIDS will develop in the 1.5 million 
or more infected, asymptomatic in- 
dividuals have been rising steadily. 
Even a year ago it had seemed pos- 
sible that a large majority of them 
would remain disease-free, even 
though the nature of the virus infec- 
tion would render them infectious 
for life. But the Epidemiology Work- 
ing Group for the IOMNAS study 
was faced with harsh new realities: 
as the U.S. epidemic finished its fifth 
year in 1986, the expected down- 
turn in the frequency with which 
seropositive individuals became ill 
had not materialized. The incuba- 
tion period estimate had been ex- 
tended steadily from two to more 
than four years. Indeed, a few pa- 
tients were illustrating a dreadful 
new facet of the virus’ potential, for 
immunologic disease-for which 
the syndrome was named and which 
had been deemed the hallmark of 
HIV pathogenicity-was sometimes 
preceded and occasionally replaced 
by destructive, progressive disease of 
the central nervous system. These 
new insights forced a revision in 
thinking about prognosis, and by 
the time of the report 25 percent was 
viewed as a conservative estimate of 
the likelihood of disease in infected 
individuals; and the way was left 
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during earlier stages of their illness, 
not to mention homeless 25-year- 
old addicts or prostitutes. 
The medical and health care facts 
alone present daunting problems, 
but the Committee’s report brought 
out other dimensions as well. Be- 
cause the epidemic in this coun- 
try has thus far focused its fury on 
groups such as gay men and intra- 
venous drug abusers, who are al- 
ready at the fringe of societal toler- 
ance, community reactions to AIDS 
have sometimes posed a serious 
threat to the pluralism that is at 
the heart of our democratic system. 
Widespread fear has been general- 
ized to entire groups of individuals 
in ways that infringe on their civil 
liberties. AIDS and ARC patients are 
at jeopardy in matters as basic as 
employment, insurance, housing, 
and educational opportunity. Terror 
pursues them even beyond the grave, 
as funeral directors balk at dealing 
with their remains. 
These threats to the fundamental 
rights on which our society is based 
are especially worrisome because 
they derive largely from the un- 
founded fear of casual contagion, 
even though the reassuring facts 
concerning transmissibility are re- 
inforced with each new study of the 
American epidemic: only sex, blood 
(and needles), or birth-pre- or post- 
natal transfer of virus to the new- 
born-are implicated as routes of 
infection. Exhaustive review of per- 
sons and situations in which other 
modes of spread might have occurred 
yield nothing: not even infection by 
HIV, much less AIDS, has transpired 
in settings as intimate as months- 
long home care of loved ones dying 
of AIDS; sharing of razors, tooth- 
brushes, and toilets; hospital care 
of yet-to-be-diagnosed infected pa- 
tients; or even accidental needle- 
pricks or lacerations with sharp in- 
struments directly after their use in 
AIDS patients. 
These tests of transmissibility 
have occurred in the natural settings 
of homes and hospitals, but it would 
open, of necessity, for further up- 
ward revision. While the report 
settled on an upper boundary of 50 
percent for its official estimate, it 
was the opinion of some experienced 
epidemiologists in the study group 
that a substantial majority of in- 
fected individuals would some day 
suffer devastating and ultimately le- 
thal disease resulting directly from 
the immunologic and/or neurologic 
destruction attendant on infection 
with HIV. 
The grimness of these predic- 
tions for the indwiduals involved is 
amplified by their repercussions on 
the larger society. Health care costs 
directly resulting from AIDS are pro- 
jected to escalate from a base of zero 
in 1977 (even in retrospect, the dis- 
ease was nonexistent in the United 
States until that time) to $8-$16 
billion annually by 1991. This ap- 
palling figure does not include any 
additional cost estimates for non- 
AIDS illness caused by HIV, nor does 
it allow for innovative therapies yet 
to be invented. Experience to date- 
summarized in the report-suggests 
that modifications of our rigid, in- 
terventive medical care ’approaches 
and systems could improve the qual- 
ity of care, as well as cutting its costs 
several-fold. Yet the Committee’s 
study revealed that strategies to 
implement such flexible patient- 
oriented, cost-effective care are 
barely on the drawing board, despite 
the urgency of their present need. 
Nursing homes and hospices may 
offer far more appropriate care and 
solace than do intensive care units 
for many victims of the new virus, 
and yet demographic and sociologi- 
cal features of the epidemic result in 
refusal or reluctance of existing in- 
stitutions to respond. Hospices are a 
relatively new phenomenon in health 
care and are still relatively scarce, 
while nursing homes have been de- 
signed, in large part, to meet the 
needs of 8 5-year-old ladies of means. 
They are distinctly inhospitable to 
3 5-year-old single men who have 
had to “spend down” to destitution 
have been difficult to design a more 
rigorous set of experiments to test 
the assertion that HIV is difficult 
to transmit. Actually, these results 
make good biological sense, for HIV 
is a lentivirus-one of a number of 
members of the retrovirus subgroup 
that are characterized by a long in- 
cubation period, a predilection for 
the central nervous system and for 
lymphoid cells, species specificity 
and a greatly restricted transmissi- 
bility. Therefore the data concerning 
the new human virus are not only 
convincing in their own right but 
also fit well with what is known 
about several related viruses in other 
species. This reassurance about poor 
transmissibility underscores the need 
to address those destructive social 
dynamics that are fueled by misper- 
ceptions and misplaced fear of con- 
tact contagion. The challenge to the 
legal system to maintain fairness in 
the face of widespread anxiety is a 
formidable one. 
A special focus of the Commit- 
tee’s attention was the status of the 
blood supply, for a major, unavoid- 
able source of risk early in the epi- 
demic was contaminated blood and 
blood products. As early as March 
1983, before HIV was identified, in- 
formation about risk groups led to a 
plea by the U.S. Public Health Ser- 
vice that persons at risk refrain from 
donation. Months later, when HIV 
was isolated and grown in the labo- 
ratory, rapid mobilization of tech- 
nology yielded a reliable, sensitive 
screening system for evidence of 
viral infection in blood and plasma. 
Since 1985 that system has been in 
place at blood centers throughout 
the country. 
As a result of this two-pronged 
approach, the risk of blood trans- 
mission of HIV has been dramati- 
cally reduced, although not to zero. 
The Committee assessed the residual 
chance of acquiring HIV from a unit 
of blood in the U.S. as I : IOO,OOO, 
far below the risks posed by most 
clinical conditions in which transfu- 
sion is indicated. The direct benefits 
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estimated 750,000 IV heroin addicts 
plus at least an equal number of per- 
sons who experiment with IV drugs 
on an intermittent basis. The fact 
that 60 percent or more of New York 
City addicts are already infected, for 
example, lends urgency to the need 
to expand our overtaxed treatment 
capacity to deal with addiction. The 
fact that other large metropolitan 
areas, such as h s  Angeles, have yet 
to see much dissemination of HIV 
among addicts suggests that timely 
intervention could reap large re- 
wards in terms of prevention. 
The IV drug abuse issue is espe- 
cially worrisome in that many health 
care innovations to date have been 
predominantly designed by and for 
gay males. Efforts to deal with ad- 
dicts in the same terms have resulted 
in much frustration. Furthermore, 
the heterosexual partners of IV drug 
abusers have illustrated, from the be- 
ginning of the epidemic, that homo- 
sexual practices are not the only 
route of sexual spread of the virus. 
The study group predicted that 90 
percent of pediatric AIDS will occur 
in infants born into drug-afflicted 
families and infected in utero or in 
the perinatal period. Thus the spe- 
cial horrors of AIDS as it occurs 
clinically will be compounded by pa- 
rental drug abuse andlor orphan 
status as more and more perinatally 
infected infants survive and undergo 
progressive virus-mediated dam- 
age to their nervous and immune 
systems. 
The fundamental charge to the 
IOMiNAS Committee, as noted ear- 
lier, was to delineate a national strat- 
egy for AIDS. While the rapid evo- 
lution of the problems established 
some natural limits to the precision 
of planning, serious effort was made 
in the report to point out the path- 
ways that are open for promising 
progress and those that are espe- 
cially forbidding. 
First and foremost, the Commit- 
tee urged continuation of the intense 
and fruitful endeavors in biomedical 
of knowing the blood supply is safe 
are obvious, and there are indirect 
benefits as well. It is now possible 
to focus public health efforts on 
education to facilitate prevention of 
further virus spread by individual 
decision-making about avoidance of 
risky behavior. 
In that regard we are fortunate, 
for in other parts of the world the 
strategy of avoidance is not so easy 
to adopt. In parts of Africa, the scale 
of the epidemic is approaching truly 
disruptive levels as substantial frac- 
tions of adult populations are in- 
volved. There is real disaster in the 
offing for efforts at medical care of 
AIDS patients in such countries, 
where the annual per capita invest- 
ment in health care is often less than 
the cost of a single AIDS-antibody 
screening test. That something must 
be done quickly is underscored by 
the increasingly ominous reports of 
infection in 10 percent or more of 
adult populations in parts of Central 
and East Africa, but even fundamen- 
tal issues of transmissibility are 
obscured in those areas where “in- 
jectionism” and heterosexual pro- 
miscuity complicate efforts at pre- 
vention of further spread. What is 
clear is that the blood supply is far 
from secure in such areas, and both 
donation and usage patterns under- 
score the benefits of having achieved 
quick control of that facet of HWs 
spread. 
While African countries and the 
United States have experienced in- 
creasing epidemic involvement since 
the early 1980s, some parts of the 
world, especially Asia, are still rela- 
tively unaffected. Most countries in 
Europe and in the Western hemi- 
sphere have begun to experience 
the rapidly expanding onslaught of 
AIDS, with epidemic patterns more 
reminiscent of the U.S. than of Af- 
rica. The prominent role of intra- 
venous drug abuse as a risk behavior 
in several countries, such as Italy 
and Sweden, underscores the poten- 
tial danger posed in the U.S. by the 
research. The clarity with which 
many of the above assessments and 
prognostications were made derived 
from the rapid exploitation of a rich 
pre-existing base of fundamental 
knowledge in immunology, virology, 
and molecular biology. Just as im- 
portant, the insights needed to fur- 
ther define and pursue leads that 
will ultimately facilitate effective vac- 
cine and treatment strategies will re- 
quire further advances. It is likely 
that many of these will derive from 
broad progress on the basic science 
front rather than from sharply tar- 
geted assaults on specific problems. 
The Committee noted the contribu- 
tions of epidemiology to our under- 
standing of the new virus and its 
pathogenic behavior, and under- 
scored the need for continuing epi- 
demiologic investigations, both to 
address questions still outstanding 
and to remain alert for new insights 
or change. 
Despite the past triumphs and 
ongoing need for biomedical re- 
search, however, the Committee 
concluded that neither vaccine nor 
therapeutic cure is likely to emerge 
as a major useful strategy within the 
next five years. This appraisal was 
arrived at after much careful discus- 
sion and assessment of possible ave- 
nues of approach. It is worth noting 
that the Committee included several 
of the scientists whose research had 
led to the current advanced state of 
knowledge concerning the human 
retrovirus. Their opinion should not 
be undervalued as pessimism, nor 
should it be received with nihilistic 
resignation. Rather, it was a sober 
judgment arrived at after review of 
the extraordinary difficulties atten- 
dant on achieving either a vaccine or 
a therapeutic strategy for dealing 
with HIV. 
In the realm of immunization, 
notwithstanding the impressive feats 
of recent decades that have banished 
such scourges as polio and measles, 
there are no examples yet developed 
of useful vaccines for chronic viral 
3- 
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after most of the text of the report 
had been written. In the blush of 
promise that prevailed at the time 
the study results were announced, 
the final draft was modified some- 
what to hedge the gloomy predic- 
tions that development of effective 
therapeutic agents might be more 
than five years off. Yet the Commit- 
tee’s initial attitude of caution ap- 
pears to have been well founded. As 
further experience develops, the pro- 
longation of life in AZT-treated pa- 
tients-which led federal officials 
to discontinue placebo-controlled 
experiments on ethical grounds- 
turns out to be achieved at the cost 
of an extraordinarily high rate of 
transfusion-dependency resulting 
from hematotoxicity. 
Thus the conclusion that bio- 
medical miracles should not be ex- 
pected to provide a quick solution 
to this problem is, if anything, re- 
inforced by the AZT experience. It is 
no accident that antiviral therapy 
has been so long in coming, in con- 
trast to antibacterial drugs. Viral 
infections are so parasitic in their 
commandeering of host cell func- 
tions to reproduce themselves that 
any chemical defense must attack 
processes that may be integral to the 
host’s good health. That truism is 
even more pertinent in the context 
of retroviruses, where the initial 
event of infection usually splices viral 
genetic information right into the 
host’s own DNA, and subsequent 
viral production is intimately linked 
to host-cell control mechanisms. In 
such circumstances treatment must 
almost surely be sustained over 
months or years, perhaps for the 
lifetime of the host. Thus, drugs that 
could serve the million or more in- 
fected individuals would need to be 
exceptionally non-toxic, not to men- 
tion inexpensive, in order to serve a 
useful public health purpose. 
The long road to biomedical 
“breakthrough” must be traveled 
with a sense of urgency. By the 
same token, however, the Commit- 
infections in which antibodies do 
not play a dominant defensive role 
in host response. The new retrovirus 
that causes AIDS establishes a life- 
long infection in its host, and there 
is a strong suggestion from develop- 
ing data that antibodies do not cor- 
relate with protection from illness. 
Furthermore, confirmatory warn- 
ings of difficulty come from the study 
of other retrovirus infections in spe- 
cies of veterinary interest, where vac- 
cine efforts to date have met with 
marginal success at best. 
Some of the predicted problems 
arise from the fact that the rapid 
mutability of HIV’s genetic message 
results in what is termed antigenic 
variation. This genetic plasticity 
might render a vaccine strain of virus 
obsolete in the face of new variants. 
The paucity of animal models pre- 
sents another hurdle in the way of 
both vaccine and treatment develop- 
ment. While several primate species 
have been found to have their own 
AIDS-like retroviral infections, only 
chimpanzees, among potential host 
species, can be infected with HIV. 
But the chimpanzee is an endan- 
gered species, and the absolute num- 
ber of animals available for study is 
extraordinarily limited and must be 
rationed with great deliberation and 
care. Finally, even if an ideal vaccine 
candidate were at hand, time con- 
straints intrinsic to the design and 
evaluation of vaccine trials for a dis- 
ease with a four- to five-year incuba- 
tion period would mean that a mass 
strategy for prevention by immu- 
nization would be years off. 
Efforts at treatment with anti- 
viral drugs are inherently compli- 
cated because of the intimate nature 
of HIV infection; once established, 
the viral genetic message is durably 
entwined with the genes of host cells 
in such a way that lifelong therapy 
would almost surely be necessary to 
maintain suppression of the virus. 
The pace of progress in biomedical 
spheres is so rapid that the new drug 
AZT emerged as a promising agent 
tee noted a great need for parallel 
research efforts in social and behav- 
ioral sciences to facilitate commu- 
nity and national efforts to interrupt 
the spread of the epidemic. Indeed, 
it was the unpromising prospect 
of cure or vaccine development, 
coupled with the poor transmissibil- 
ity of the virus, that led the Commit- 
tee to its most striking conclusion: 
that education was likely to be the 
cornerstone of our response to the 
AIDS threat for years to come. They 
noted that practical means of pre- 
vention-avoidance of unsafe sex 
practices, use of barrier devices such 
as condoms, and avoidance of intra- 
venous drugs and/or contaminated 
drug paraphernalia-were ready at 
hand and should be mobilized as 
rapidly as possible. To this end it was 
recommended that for every dollar 
spent on biomedical research (and a 
research funding level of $I billion 
was called for by 1990)~ an equal 
sum should be invested in preventive 
education and public health endeav- 
ors to communicate what we already 
know and to minimize the further 
spread of HIV. This call for an in- 
tensive educational campaign advo- 
cated the frank and detailed expla- 
nation of the sexual modes of spread 
and proposed utilization of a wide 
variety of media in order to reach 
the heterogeneous social and eco- 
nomic groups at risk. 
It is not possible in a brief com- 
mentary to convey the breadth of 
issues tackled in the IOM/NAS study. 
For instance, the Committee report 
included a detailed discussion of the 
ethical issues raised by public health 
concerns. The group took a firm 
stance against mandatory screening 
programs and urged that serological 
testing for HIV antibodies be avail- 
able on a strictly confidential basis 
in the context of pre- and post-test 
counseling. The report suggested 
that the issues of insurance and of 
health care financing were so com- 
plex that special task forces should 
be established quickly to address 
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sponses required in the predicted 
crisis, the proposed commission was 
felt to be an important mechanism 
whereby these components could be 
orchestrated and stimulated to inter- 
act successfully. 
The impact of the IOM/NAS re- 
port remains to be seen. It is en- 
couraging to note that in the days 
immediately preceding its release, 
the surgeon general of the United 
States took a strong stance of ad- 
vocacy for early sex education of 
children in the schools-a much- 
needed component of the educa- 
tional program envisioned by the 
Committee. It is perhaps too soon to 
bemoan the fact that the called-for 
studies of insurance and health care 
them. It also advocated substantial 
involvement in international health 
problems posed by the epidemic, 
with particular emphasis on co- 
operation with international agen- 
cies such as the World Health 
Organization. 
Finally, the Committee concluded 
that the potential breadth of impact 
of the epidemic warranted creation 
of an ongoing commission with ei- 
ther presidential or presidential- 
congressional mandate to help co- 
ordinate the efforts of the varied 
sectors of society that would be 
pressed to respond to the disease. 
Since government, industry, and aca- 
demia all must play distinctive roles 
in order to maximize the effective re- 
financing, and the establishment of a 
Commission have not yet evoked a 
response; but it is also difficult to be 
patient. The “duty to warn” seems 
increasingly imperative as the fearful 
finality of AIDS becomes ever clearer. 
The estimated size of the infected 
population is so large already that 
one o r  two more doublings could 
take the social scope of the problem 
beyond our ability to cope humanely 
with its consequences. The sense of 
urgency conveyed so clearly by the 
IOh4/NAS Committee must be main- 
tained. The price of bureaucratic in- 
ertia in this unique period of human 
history would be intolerably high. 
